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Chapter 6
Worth the Effort: Protesting Successfully 
Against Deportations
Maren Kirchhoff, Johanna Probst, Helen Schwenken, and Verena Stern
6.1  Introduction
One of the most exciting but certainly also the most difficult questions of social 
movement research is determining whether and how protest activities spur change 
in the direction intended by the protesters. From the protest actors’ point of view, 
this comes down to wondering whether it was “worth the effort,” as alluded to in 
the title of Giugni’s (1998) article on the impact of social movements. As an exami-
nation of our data from a research project on anti-deportation protests as well as the 
literature on deportation reveals, there is no consensus on the patterns of success. 
Some protest actors tend to explain their success in challenging deportations 
according to the duration, intensity, and determination of their investment, as illus-
trated by this quote: “You don’t need a lot of people! … The only thing you need is 
this absolute willingness that we all had. It was very time-intensive, but no one 
complained.” (Interview CH5_2).1 By contrast, Albert Scherr (2015, 168, transla-
tion by the authors) has depicted the stopping of deportations as complex and 
contingent:
1 Interviews were conducted in English, German, and French. All translations into English were 
done by the authors. References to the interviews indicate country (A = Austria; CH = Switzerland; 
D = Germany), case and interview number, e.g. CH5_2 refers to interview No. 2 in Swiss case 
study No. 5.
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Both the scope for decisions of courts and the randomness of the conditions that affect the 
availability of lawyers, of support by civil society groups, or the decisions of the Hardship 
Commission and petition committees, constitute an unpredictable and unsafe situation for 
refugees.
For our study on anti-deportation protests in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 
this raises the question of whether there are patterns that lead to successfully pre-
venting the enforcement of a deportation order. Is there a formula for success or 
failure? To what extent can protest actors influence the outcome? To find answers to 
these questions, the use of analytical concepts from social movement studies is the 
first choice, although we do not investigate a movement aiming at social change per 
se, but protests with a clearly defined goal, namely to prevent an impending deporta-
tion, and often performed by people who are not necessarily social movement activ-
ists. Most scholars in the field of social movement studies (Amenta et al. 2010; Bosi 
and Uba 2009; Giugni 1998) focus on the impact of social movements and their 
contributions to social change as well as legal and political reforms more generally. 
Our case specificities, however, have led us to adjust the instruments used by social 
movement studies to analyze successful protest outcomes. We mainly draw on Felix 
Kolb’s  (2007) concept of causal mechanisms of political change. Examining our 
material with regard to four of the mechanisms described by this author–public pref-
erence, political access to decision-making authorities, judicial means, and disrup-
tion–at least one of the four mechanisms can be identified for all successful cases.
In order to explain protest outcomes, social movement studies often distinguish 
between exogenous and endogenous factors. To some extent, our analysis diverges 
from this distinction, because we observe a creative moment in some of the protests 
where exogenous conditions were actively redefined and interpreted to make them 
work for the protest. Some of these exogenous factors are part of the political oppor-
tunity structures, of which many are national. However, we find in the so-called 
Dublin transfer cases that a specific European opportunity structure allowed the 
protesters to successfully activate the disruption mechanism (as explained below). 
Given our sample of 15 qualitative case studies and our findings that show mecha-
nisms working similarly in all of the three national contexts, we cannot safely pro-
pose the existence of patterns at the national level that explain the outcomes (see 
Part III of this book, in particular Ruedin et al. 2018). Instead, we argue that the four 
mechanisms we have identified are accessed or used in their specific local and 
national contexts. This means that institutional and political contexts indeed matter. 
Nevertheless, the distinctions are not clear enough to explain outcomes according to 
specific national factors.
6.2  Explaining Success in Protests against Deportation
The explanation of a movement’s success or failure is one of the big questions in 
social movement studies–one that remains largely unresolved. William Gamson 
(1990) attempted to boil down a rich body of studies to factors that could explain 
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success, finding for example that groups which use violence, groups with single- 
issue demands, and well-organized groups have a higher likelihood of success than 
other groups. Though Gamson’s meta-study has been perennially contested (Giugni 
1998; Giugni et al. 1999), it nevertheless continues to highlight the difficult task of 
analyzing movement outcomes.
This chapter is located at the intersection between social movement studies and 
research on migration and deportation. Deportation and anti-deportation protests 
have been increasingly investigated in scholarly research in recent years. However, 
only few of these studies have investigated the outcomes of anti-deportation pro-
tests. Even fewer have referred to empirical research on this issue from a compara-
tive perspective–a research gap that motivated this trilateral comparative project. 
After presenting some studies on anti-deportation protests, we discuss selected 
social movement studies that address the question of movement outcomes in order 
to identify different explanations for success. Our case-study data then prepares the 
ground for our empirical analysis of mechanisms favoring success.
While some studies on anti-deportation protests focus explicitly on explaining 
the success or failure of such protests, others tackle the issue more implicitly. Based 
on a comparative analysis of deportation practices in Germany and the United 
States, Antje Ellermann (2005, 1219) identified differences in the “capacity of 
bureaucrats to implement contested deportation orders” due to shifting interests of 
policymakers at various stages of the policy process:
[A]s policy moves from legislation to implementation, public attention changes its focus 
from the benefits of deportation to its costs, with important consequences. As public atten-
tion shifts, so do the incentives of state actors. This … unstable nature of state actors’ incen-
tives threatens to undermine the state’s socially coercive capacity. (Ellermann 2009, 14)
This analysis goes beyond a postulation of the self-limited sovereignty of liberal 
states, focusing on power relations rather than normative restrictions. Shifting from 
a focus on street-level bureaucrats and politicians to the migrants themselves, 
Ellermann (2010) noted that due to the proclaimed limited sovereignty of liberal 
states, undocumented migrants under a deportation order often succeed in subvert-
ing the states’ exercise of sovereign power by strategically destroying their official 
documents.
Despite a very different theoretical starting point and a focus on different actors, 
Miltiadis Oulios (2013, 312, translation by the authors) came to the same conclu-
sion as Ellermann, emphasizing that long before petitions and public campaigns, the 
main form of resistance for those who were to be deported was the strategic han-
dling of formal identity:
Organizing demonstrations is more laborious than declaring another name or having no 
passport, even though it is a merely passive resistance that is accompanied by a massive 
deprivation of rights. By tactical reduction of their “true” identity, more people succeed in 
hindering their deportation than could be prevented solely by public actions.
From this perspective, acts of resistance carried out by the concerned persons 
themselves seem to be, at first glance, more effective for preventing deportations 
than other less direct protest activities–but certainly not for obtaining a permanent 
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legal status. Focusing either on the scope of action available to migrants or on poli-
cymakers’ openness to anti-implementation protests in general, neither Oulious’ 
nor Ellermann’s contributions help us to appraise the differences in protests against 
deportation with regard to their outcomes.
A profoundly skeptical view on the attempt to find patterns for successful out-
comes, as already mentioned in the introduction, has been outlined by Scherr 
(2015). His study points to several aspects that may prevent deportations in a con-
siderable amount of cases, where the designated deportees receive support from 
civil society actors, including competent legal advice, successful petitions, and 
hardship applications or medical reports. However, for Scherr, it seems that the 
relationship between a specific deportation and its prevention by any specific means 
is erratic and contingent. He then refers to the legal system and the fact that not even 
experienced lawyers can foresee whether a claim might be successful or not.
The literature on anti-deportation protests thus presents a whole spectrum of 
answers to the question of success or failure–from executive actors’ capacities to 
enforce deportations over factors internal to the movement (strategic competency) 
to complete contingency. While acknowledging that the process contains elements 
of contingency, we try to locate these in a more precise way and to identify mecha-
nisms that favor successful protest. For that purpose, it seems promising to us to 
draw on additional theoretical insights from social movement research explicitly 
tackling the question of social movements’ outcomes and impact. However, this 
does not bring easy solutions. Several studies (Gamson 1990; Giugni 1998; Giugni 
et al. 1999; Bosi and Uba 2009; Amenta et al. 2010) have pointed out the various 
methodological problems of such an analysis. According to Marco Giugni (1998, 
373), one main difficulty is the establishment of a causal relationship between social 
movement actions and observed changes in society. Research on movement impact 
has therefore come to very different conclusions regarding, for example, the use of 
disruptive tactics and actions. Giugni pointed out that the key to solving this prob-
lem lies in acknowledging the role of the political context, both for the mobilization 
and outcomes of protests as well as for the varying effectiveness of certain strategies 
(Giugni 1998, 379). This does not mean that issues of context such as public opinion 
or political opportunity structures alone can explain the outcome of protests, but 
they have to be taken into consideration. In line with Giugni, Kolb (2007, 274, his 
emphasis) argues:
…whether or not a social movement will succeed in activating a mechanism of political 
change depends on three factors: 1) the strength of the movement; 2) its strategy–defined as 
the use of certain tactics to pursue specific political goals; and 3) the cultural, economic, 
and, particularly, political context.
Kolb’s work thus suggests that applying the concept of a causal mechanism 
enables us to cognitively connect external conditions and the intervention of mobi-
lizations to the likelihood of political change. He noted that while several dynamic 
mechanisms often work together, a “particular kind of policy effect should be iden-
tifiable” for each mechanism (Kolb 2007, 72). To analyze these mechanisms, it is 
important to identify the circumstances necessary for their activation. Kolb (ibid., 
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72–94) presented five different causal mechanisms of political change: disruption, 
public preference with regards to the issue at stake, political access of the mobilized 
actors, judicial means, and international politics. He thus reinterprets factors such as 
political opportunity and public opinion, which are generally conceived as exoge-
nous factors influencing protests. Instead of taking these factors for granted as struc-
tures strictly external to social movement influence, he emphasizes the specific 
interventions of challengers and analyzes how such mechanisms could be activated 
with regard to the goals of the protest. Such an approach also suits our data better 
and carries greater explanatory potential than more standard approaches in social 
movement studies, and so we have adopted Kolb’s approach regarding mechanisms 
to a large extent. This comes down to analyzing how protesters refer to and deal 
with structural conditions in order to achieve their aims–thus redefining them as 
endogenous factors of protest outcome. At the same time, we do not deny the exis-
tence and relevance of institutional factors, such as national political opportunity 
structures, but we do argue that they (alone) turn out to be insufficient for a deeper 
understanding of the outcome of anti-deportation protests. Our use of Kolb’s mech-
anisms will be described in more detail later.
6.3  Data and Methodology
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of 15 anti-deportation cases which 
occurred in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland between 2007 and 2015, and which 
form part of a larger, trilateral research project on contested deportations. The selec-
tion of the cases was based on a broad media analysis of two newspapers per coun-
try, analyzing media reports between 1993 and 2013 (see Ruedin et al. 2018). The 
five cases from each country were, among other criteria, selected with regard to 
their outcome: Drawing on information from the media, each national corpus 
includes two successful outcomes (in which deportation was prevented due to pro-
test), two unsuccessful outcomes (in which deportation was carried out despite pro-
tests), and one case still pending at the time of writing (involving recent protests 
against Dublin transfers). Taking the information obtained throughout the qualita-
tive case studies into account, the corpus ultimately includes eight cases of success-
ful protest in which planned deportations were suspended. In seven cases, protesting 
was unsuccessful. However, as we learned during our fieldwork, in six of these 
seven cases, the deportees were able to reenter the respective country, most likely 
with the protesters’ help and due to official or unofficial agreements.
The case studies are mainly based on qualitative interviews with the principal 
protest actors (sometimes including the beneficiaries of the protest2) conducted by 
the three country teams (more than 90 interviews in total). The interview transcripts, 
as well as protest material collected throughout the field study, were thematically 
2 In the following, we use the term beneficiary/-ies to designate the individual/s whose impending 
deportation is challenged by the protesters.
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coded in MAXQDA on the basis of a joint codebook with 26 codes. Drawing on this 
data, we analyzed the cases in light of the literature presented above, referring espe-
cially to Giugni and Kolb.
It is the strength of such comprehensive case-study data that allows us to recon-
struct–in detail and with the necessary complexity–the constellations of cases and 
actors, and to shed light on protest dynamics. This led us to engage each of the pos-
sible mechanisms to explain protest outcomes. Because we were dealing with quali-
tative data based on a limited number of cases, we were cautious about (but did not 
completely refrain from) drawing general conclusions on exogenous determining 
factors related to political opportunity structures and national contexts (see Part II in 
this volume) or cause-effect relations. The subsequent analysis reconstructs the 
cases and identifies case-specific mechanisms, allowing us to better understand why 
certain protests resulted in the successful prevention of deportations whereas others 
did not.
6.4  Mechanisms Favoring Success of Anti-Deportation 
Protests
In this section, we seek to understand the mechanisms that favor (or prevent) suc-
cess in protests against deportations.3 One of our first and most basic observations 
was that success and failure are in reality less binary than they seem to be in theory. 
As mentioned before, six out of seven deportees were, with the protesters’ support, 
able to return to the country from which they had been deported. Conceiving of this 
particular outcome (post-deportation return) as “success” would be legitimate from 
the protesters’ perspective.4 From the researchers’ perspective, as was observable in 
all 15 cases, intensive mobilization against deportations nearly always manages to 
undo initial deportation decisions. The primary and central issue of the conflicts 
which we studied was the implementation of a deportation decision. In order to take 
into account the capacity of the various states in question to implement such a deci-
sion in the face of resistance, we decided to define “success” as effectively prevent-
ing the implementation of the deportation decision, regardless of what happened 
afterwards. We furthermore have to acknowledge that some of the protests under 
investigation included claims beyond the case at hand, such as a general right to stay 
or the abolition of borders in general (Bader and Probst 2018). For our present 
3 We note that the protests studied in this research project are mainly organized by members of 
established civil society with secure residency status and thus differ from self-organized migrant 
protests (see Part IV in this volume). Nevertheless, the beneficiaries generally take part in the 
protests, in a more or less active way.
4 Equally, the suspension of a deportation decision does not always lead to a permanent right to 
stay, as is typical in the Dublin cases we observed. Renewed attempts to implement deportation 
may occur later on.
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purposes, however, we define success exclusively with regard to the protesters’ cen-
tral goal of preventing a particular deportation.
The comparison of the “successful” and “unsuccessful” cases, thus defined (see 
Table 6.1), at first glance reveals no striking patterns: The two groups of cases do 
not differ significantly with regard to any fundamental characteristic. A closer look 
at the beneficiaries’ initial situation, the various aspects of the local context and, 
above all, the protesters’ interventions, reveals that certain protest strategies tend to 
be effective in certain contexts–an issue which we will refer to in the following as 
mechanisms.
First and foremost, the initial situation of the beneficiaries, especially with regard 
to legal aspects and their personal backgrounds, largely determines the kind of pro-
test activities that develop. The concept of deportability (De Genova 2002, 438), 
signifying the possibility of being deported, can indeed materialize in different 
ways: Subjects become “deportable” for different reasons, such as the material or 
formal (Dublin) rejection of an asylum claim, the discovery of a situation of irregu-
larity, and so forth. Deportation must be understood as a process which can be 
halted, disrupted, or blocked at different points in time. The initial situation thus 
determines the possibilities of intervention or, in other words, the kinds of strategies 
that have the potential to be successful in preventing deportation. This corresponds 
to Giugni’s and Kolb’s insights that the success of movement strategies can only be 
Table 6.1 Overview of cases and outcomes (n = 15)
Deported Not deported
Austria A_2 (young girl from Kosovo, rejected 
asylum claim, post-deportation return)
A_1 (young Nigerian man, rejected 
asylum claim)
A_3 (family from Kosovo, one son a 
soccer talent, rejected asylum claim)
A_5 (5 Syrian asylum seekers in 
Dublin procedure)
A_4 (young twin sisters and father from 
Kosovo, rejected asylum claim, post- 
deportation return)
Germany D_2 (Roma family with two children, 
rejected asylum claim, post-deportation 
return)
D_1 (2 schoolgirls from Latin 
America, stay as undocumented 
migrants)
D_3 (young man from Kosovo, stay as 
undocumented migrant, post-deportation 
return)
D_4 (Pakistani man, rejected asylum 
claim, in custody pending 
deportation)
D_5 (over 30 asylum seekers in 
Dublin procedure)
Switzerland CH_1 (man from Kosovo, stay as 
undocumented migrant, post-deportation 
return)
CH_2 (man from Kosovo and family, 
long stay as undocumented migrant)
CH_4 (Iraqi man in Dublin procedure, 
post-deportation return)
CH_3 (6 African men in Dublin 
procedure)
CH_5 (twin sisters and mother from 
Serbia, lost residency permit after 
legal stay)
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assessed in relation to the specific case context. Depending on the given situation, 
the actors are likely to mobilize a certain repertoire of protest forms.
Whereas Kolb has reflected on broad social movements aiming at social and 
political change in the long run, our research deals with intermittent protests 
expressing specific claims and relating to a shorter timespan. With reference to 
Giugni (1998, 373), we look at minor changes at the meso-level, arguing that four 
of the five mechanisms identified by Kolb (2007, 73)–namely (a) public preference, 
(b) political access, (c) judicial means, and (d) disruption–can be applied to explain 
the outcomes of specific anti-deportation protests. In the following, we introduce 
our conceptualizations of these mechanisms and analyze how protesters were able 
to successfully activate them. As our cases show, actors do not usually rely on one 
mechanism exclusively, but instead employ a combination–even though these do 
not necessarily accumulate to the benefit of the deportees (in the sense of “more is 
better”). Instead, combinations can also work in a counterproductive way and even 
decrease the chances of success.
 (a) Public Preference
When looking at anti-deportation protests in Germany and the United States, 
Ellermann (2009) pointed out that the goal of most of these protests was to influence 
the calculus of politicians involved in the policymaking process, as “public attention 
shifts from the purported benefits of regulation to its harsh cost” (ibid., 16). This 
finding dovetails with Kolb’s (2007, 77) more general claim that one key strategy of 
social movements is to form public preferences for their demands in order to con-
vince policymakers to modify their personal preferences. The forming of public 
preference is understood here as the efforts made by protesters to create favorable 
publicity; this means ensuring that their claims are heard and consequently shared 
by a broad public. This is mainly achieved by attracting media attention to the 
deportation case itself as well as the protest activities that are designed to prompt a 
revocation of the deportation decision.5
To influence public opinion on the case, and thereby to put pressure on decision 
makers, media coverage does not only need to be broad but also positive, influenc-
ing the audience’s opinion on the case in a way that supports the protesters’ claims. 
In most of the cases we analyzed, “going public” was a consciously selected strat-
egy in order to demand a change to the administrative decisions by referring to 
public preference. This mechanism was deliberately adopted in cases where there 
was no pre-established access to influential actors in the administrative and/or polit-
ical sphere, and thus where an immediate discretionary decision by those actors 
seemed difficult to obtain (see (b) below on the mechanism of political access). 
Furthermore, media attention is considered an important means of controlling 
administrative agencies and politicians, preventing unlawful decisions that only few 
people would have noticed without the media spotlight (Eule 2014, 84). The public 
preference mechanism turns out to be most effective when public outrage is 
5 Due to the method by which the studied cases were selected (media articles), our sample includes 
only medialized cases.
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 produced on the basis of broadly shared moral principles of justice, compassion, or 
family values. However, public preference alone is not a sufficient condition for 
success, as the following Austrian cases illustrate:
One of the cases in which public preference proved to be pivotal was the case of 
a father and his two daughters who were deported to Kosovo and thus separated 
from the family’s mother, who was undergoing psychiatric treatment for suicidal 
thoughts at the time of the deportation enforcement (case A4). After a documentary 
was released depicting their removal from an NGO-run shelter6 for persons with 
precarious residency status, the deportation was heavily criticized. Following mas-
sive protests the three were brought back to Austria by order of the Minister of the 
Interior (Austrian People’s Party) and received a humanitarian residency permit. 
Here, the effectivity of public preference unfolded after the deportation, since pro-
testers managed to bring about the family’s return.
The potential to transform public anger into success in anti-deportation protests 
is greater when the outrage is based on legal errors, such as in case A1: Having lived 
in Vienna for 8  years, a 24-year-old apprentice was taken into custody pending 
deportation. At this point, he had already submitted an application for permanent 
residency. He was not allowed to communicate with the outside world. However, his 
girlfriend informed other people who initiated a protest. His legal advisors and 
members of the Green Party started to agitate against the deportation and detention 
order. Moreover, public pressure mounted through media reports and blog posts 
calling for demonstrations against this specific deportation case and against custody 
pending deportation in general. After 3 days, the affected person was released dur-
ing a demonstration in front of the detention center. One legal adviser interpreted 
the success as follows:
They made a lot of mistakes in this case, where [we were able to intervene]. Together with 
the publicity that was generated by friends and supporters, this… created the… necessary 
pressure on the Ministry of the Interior. (Interview A1_5, lawyer)
In this case, the Minister of the Interior probably revoked the administrative deci-
sions as a reaction to both the public attention and the outrage as well as the dubious 
legal circumstances.
The Swiss case CH5 took place against the backdrop of a municipal election, 
which contributed to successful activation of the public preference mechanism. 
Benefiting from very large and positive media coverage, the case was increasingly 
picked up in the electoral battle between two competing candidates. Both professed 
solidarity with the family and backing supportive declarations. A local court finally 
decided to grant the right to stay, invoking an argument that one of the two candi-
dates had often brought up. In both CH5 and A3, success was achieved by simulta-
neous activation of the public preference mechanism and the judicial means 
mechanism; the latter is described in section (c) below.
6 This shelter was created after the deportation of a Kosovan family (A3). The entire family had 
already been deported when the protests began.
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The potential power of media attention, which in most cases accompanies the 
public preference mechanism, also has its downsides and can, at times, turn against 
the beneficiary. Many interviews revealed the intense pressure which media expo-
sure exerts on the beneficiaries (for example D1_2, D2_1, CH1_4). During the 
entire protest, the beneficiary has to behave impeccably and their image must be 
perfect, since the slightest faux pas can resonate negatively in the media and there-
fore thwart any potential success of the protests. Our case studies further corrobo-
rate the negative effects which publicity and strong media attention can have on the 
case outcome: It may reinforce the resolve of political decision-makers who want to 
prove themselves incorruptible and capable of straightforward law enforcement, 
and wish to avoid potentially setting a precedent. Austrian case A2 demonstrates 
that intense activation of the public preference mechanism might lead the respective 
decision-makers in the spotlight of media attention to demonstrate their determina-
tion: Following several months of contestation and massive media coverage, the 
Minister of the Interior declared that she would not let herself be influenced by the 
protests. The concerned persons were deported, but were able to return to Austria 
later with education and work visas. This case shows how the public preference 
mechanism can turn out to be counterproductive. This dilemma is also illustrated by 
the following quotation of one of the interviewees in our study, reflecting the chal-
lenge of finding the right way of asserting pressure and articulating public prefer-
ence in a way that it is compatible with other goals of decision-makers:
You always have to deliberate whether protest makes sense or not.… It is important not to 
put too much pressure [on the politicians]; however, at the same time… one way or the 
other you have to show them via publicity that there is public interest, which is a legal 
expression, that goes beyond the personal outrage of friends and left-wing activists.… 
There is always the question at which point do I go public. Where am I producing too much 
or bad pressure and where am I producing the [right] pressure, where they say, Ok, we are 
representatives of a restrictive residency policy, but we are also representatives of the citi-
zens. This is always a tricky thing. (Interview D1_6, lawyer)
Our analysis shows that the public preference mechanism is widely applied, but 
also that it does not guarantee success and may even negatively interfere with other 
mechanisms. It may be especially successful in cases and in national contexts in 
which political channels for exceptional decisions exist, such as in hardship cases, 
offering solutions to the problem of precedents.
 (b) Political Access
According to Kolb (2007, 83–85), the political access mechanism mainly works 
through acquisition of the right to vote or of electoral representation, with its effects 
unfolding in the long run. In our cases, however, which revolve around the aim of 
preventing a specific deportation, such long-term effects are irrelevant. Keeping in 
mind the different scope of Kolb’s analysis by contrast to our own, we argue that 
this mechanism can nevertheless be adapted. According to Kolb (ibid., 80–81), the 
“political access mechanism abandons the idea that social movements are powerless 
political outsiders, doomed to stay outside the official political process.” We 
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 understand the political access mechanism as protesters’ ability to influence the 
 preferences and behavior of decision-makers, whether in the judicial, legislative, or 
executive branch, without the detour of the public. What is particularly useful for 
our research is what Kolb calls “state-movement intersections,” which are central to 
the political access mechanism. Political access results from connections between 
protesters and decision-makers. Support may be obtained either spontaneously or 
on the basis of access to the political arena which some protesters already have, 
allowing them to contact persons in relevant positions (similarly to the practice of 
lobbying in other fields).
In case D1, the support from the advisor of a member of the state’s Hardship 
Commission supposedly played a crucial role (we take this up in section (c) on 
judicial means). A former politician of the Christian Democratic Union involved in 
the preparation of cases for the Hardship Commission was concerned with the case 
of three schoolgirls. He actively supported the three minors who had come to 
Germany with their mother on a tourist visa that they then overstayed for 6 years. 
Situated at the intersection between the protest and the decision-making sphere, he 
embodied a point of political access. A supportive lawyer told us that one protest 
strategy was to approach the members of the Hardship Commission and convince 
them that a decision for hardship would also represent their party’s position (D1_6). 
This was backed by a positive media campaign that resulted in a broad public pref-
erence in favor of the family staying.
Whereas political access and public preference mechanisms can go hand in hand, 
as in D1, their simultaneity may also be adverse to the outcome. In case CH4, the 
protesters forcefully activated the public preference mechanism and, at the same 
time, looked for political access. They gained the support of two politicians who 
raised the issue in the Swiss Federal Assembly. However, the decision-makers 
remained intransigent and deported the beneficiary. We assume that they were try-
ing to avoid setting a precedent, as the protests took place in the initial implementa-
tion phase of the Dublin regulation in Switzerland in 2009. One supportive politician 
(quoted below) as well as other protest actors and the beneficiary himself expressed 
the view that the strong media attention (public preference mechanism) ultimately 
thwarted the effectivity of the political access mechanism:
Why did this case not work out? From my point of view, it is because it became a media 
spectacle. When a case receives such media attention in a political context in which political 
authorities have very little room for maneuver, and cannot prove themselves to be… flexible 
by making exceptions…. So you can see here very well that when you have to make an 
intervention in Bern, it is sometimes better not to create any publicity around the case, 
because you would be putting the authorities in front of a choice that becomes unbearable. 
(Interview, CH4_3, politician)
As we can see from this example, public preference may in certain cases counter 
the effects of political access. Indeed, several of our interviewees pointed to the fact 
that certain protests exclusively employ the political access mechanism by finding 
influential supporters who engage in silent negotiations with the decision-makers in 
order to obtain a right to stay for the beneficiary. Due to our research design, the 
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cases we studied all received (prominent) media attention. However, our sample 
includes one case (CH1) with weak public attention, where the political access 
mechanism was activated silently. Here, negotiations with the decision-makers 
allowed for a compromise which included the deportation and the arranged post- 
deportation return of the beneficiary thanks to the acquisition of a work permit for 
particular talents. Even if deportation could not be impeded, a possibility of return 
and regularization could be achieved by the protesters–a case outcome that can 
hardly be seen as a complete failure and that we will come back to in the 
conclusion.
We ultimately have to acknowledge that, on our level of observation, the political 
arena where decisions are produced appears to a large extent as a black box. This 
black box contains negotiations behind closed doors, such as those of Hardship 
Commissions, and deal-making with persons who are able to decide on or influence 
the decision-making process in a particular case. As political scientists such as 
Kenneth Shepsle (1998, 238) have shown, “politicians engage in deal-making all 
the time,” making it appear as a key feature of institutionalized politics. It lies in the 
nature of deals that they are secret, reciprocal in character, and at the moment of the 
deal “victimizing one of the parties” (ibid.), because the payoff for the other party 
comes only later. These features of deal-making are therefore often difficult to 
accept for civil society actors who do not participate in the deal-making, especially 
in cases of negative decisions for the beneficiaries of anti-deportation protests.
The case studies show on the one hand that political, administrative, and judicial 
decisions suspending the enforcement of deportations are doubtlessly influenced by 
protest activities. These, on the other hand, are influenced by other processes we can 
hardly assess. One example is case D2, of a Roma family. The negative decision of 
the Hardship Commission might have resulted from the fact that one of the commis-
sion members had been harshly accused of ethical impropriety by the family’s father 
(interviews D2_2, D2_3); it might have been grounded in the desire not to create 
cases of precedent for further Roma (at that time, about 7000 were threatened with 
deportation in one city alone, interview D2_8). Given the non-transparent character 
of the hardship decisions and the competing interpretations of the interviewees, 
alternative explanations need to be considered.
To sum up, processes aiming at political access are methodologically difficult to 
fully reconstruct. Our sample nevertheless contains one case that was obviously 
successful due to political access, direct negotiation, and deal-making. In case CH2, 
an interviewee–a politician participating in the protests–told us that the person that 
pronounced the final decision owed him a favor. This debt was settled through the 
regularization of our interviewee’s protégé (Interview CH2_4). This dimension 
might be worth exploring for future research.
 (c) Judicial Means
Judicial contestations of deportation orders have proven to be particularly rele-
vant for a number of cases in our sample. In his general approach to explaining 
social movement success, Kolb (2007, 86) pointed out that “litigation has long been 
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known as an important movement tactic,” although it has otherwise received little 
attention. In our study, the judicial mechanism has proven to be central: In at least 
four out of eight cases where physical removal could have been prevented at any 
point in the case, judicial aspects played a decisive role for success.
Rights are not granted per se; they depend on the specific case constellation and 
have to be activated in order to be(come) effective (Buckel and Wissel 2009). 
Preconditions for the successful activation of judicial mechanisms are the existence 
of either legal gaps, i.e. procedural mistakes and ambivalences, or alternative regu-
lations including international human rights law and regional treaties that constrain 
expulsion.
The case of a 24-year-old apprentice (A1) illustrates how a deportation order can 
be revoked due to procedural mistakes. However, even if the initial deportation 
order was legally solid, alternative regulations might be successfully applied. As 
Anderson et al. (2011, 560) have pointed out, mobilization against deportation often 
refers to “constraints on expulsion imposed on governments by international human 
rights law and regional treaties.” In two of our cases, administrative courts on the 
state/cantonal and federal levels stopped deportation orders with reference to inter-
national law. In one case from Switzerland (CH5), a mother and her two teenage 
daughters who had been living in Switzerland for more than 15 years received a 
deportation notice following the mother’s divorce. It took three and a half years of 
mobilization–public protest and judicial contestation–until the final decision of the 
cantonal administrative court. The court referred to the children’s right to private 
and family life (Art. 8 ECHR), and argued that they should not be held accountable 
for their mother’s mistakes and thus had a right to reside in Switzerland. In this case, 
a combination of judicial means with the public preference mechanism presumably 
contributed to the successful outcome.
In case D4, a Pakistani fled via Greece and Hungary to Germany and was detained 
by the German federal police. During interrogation, he claimed asylum, but due to 
the Dublin regulation, the police decided to execute his transfer to Hungary. Accused 
of illegal entry, he was taken into custody pending deportation. Following nearly 
3 months of detention, the third deportation attempt was stopped by the administra-
tive court which decided that a transfer to Hungary was not in accordance with EU 
law as a constitutional asylum procedure could not be guaranteed in Hungary.
In addition, several national regulations include exceptional grounds by virtue of 
which a residency permit might be granted (see Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 in this volume). 
In Germany (§23a AufenthG) and Switzerland (Art. 14 §2 AsylG), so-called 
Hardship Commissions (Härtefallkommissionen) can reopen cases in which all 
other avenues have been exhausted. In Austria, the possibility exists to apply for a 
residency permit based on humanitarian grounds. However, this does not equal a 
humanitarian right to stay. These three different national regulations thus enable 
quasi-judicial decisions. Their existence appears to be an aspect of the opportunity 
structure, offering the protesters the possibility of exploring this solution and 
thereby activating the judicial mechanism. We have to consider, though, that deci-
sions of Hardship Commissions rely on mercy and not on the claimable rights of 
6 Worth the Effort: Protesting Successfully Against Deportations
130
migrants. The granting of a residency permit is subject to public interest. In all posi-
tive decisions the respective Minister of the Interior has the final say. The outcome 
is highly dependent on the fulfilling of necessary preconditions as well as the politi-
cal will of the decision-makers.
As mentioned above, rights are not granted per se, but have to be activated in 
order to be(come) effective. This not only depends on the existence of legal gaps or 
institutions such as hardship commissions, but also upon dynamic factors of mobi-
lization: Designated deportees need to have access to legal advice by lawyers or 
NGOs in order to get reliable information and support during legal procedures. 
Some individuals in our cases had this legal back-up while others did not, the latter 
often lacking contacts, social ties, and money. What we can safely say with our data 
is that constant support seems indispensable for persisting with a case to the point 
of a positive judicial decision. As the case of the divorced mother and her daughters 
(CH5) demonstrates, legal contestations can take years.
Activating the judicial mechanism seems to be a strategy of contestation in 
deportation cases that has realistic prospects of success, especially when the initial 
decision seems legally debatable. Furthermore, they might work as precedents for 
other cases, as the 2009 decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on 
Dublin transfers to Greece showed (Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2018). The Dublin II/III 
regulation with a time limit on transfers of 6  months7 indeed offers a particular 
political opportunity structure on the European level for contestations of Dublin 
transfers (as in D5, A5, and CH3 in our sample, as well as various other protests 
against deportation in recent years).8 By different forms of disruption (see the fol-
lowing section), activists were able to surpass this time limit in all these cases.
 (d) Disruption
Whereas Kolb (2007, 74) refers to disruption as a means that is used by protest 
groups to challenge the societal order and thus achieve concessions, we apply this 
notion on a smaller scale in the literal sense of an interruption of the enforcement of 
a specific deportation attempt.
In the three cases D5, A5, and CH3, disruption was used to shield the beneficia-
ries from the physical access of immigration and police officers. Following an 
announced deportation, activists got together to evaluate the situation (D5). After 
having gathered information on the legal framework of Dublin transfers, they came 
up with a strategy: Their idea was to prevent the expulsion of the beneficiaries until 
7 The Dublin Regulation states in Article 29, Section 1: “The transfer of the applicant… from the 
requesting Member State to the Member State responsible shall be carried out… after consultation 
between the Member States concerned, as soon as practically possible, and at the latest within 
6 months of acceptance of the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the 
person concerned or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect 
in accordance with Article 27(3)” (EP/European Council 2013). For further details and context, see 
Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2018.
8 The currently discussed reform of the Dublin Regulation foresees canceling this time limit for 
transfers (PRO ASYL 2016, 2).
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the end of the 6-month period, during which the Dublin transfers had to take place. 
This resulted in a series of protest events between March 2014 and July 2015. In this 
timeframe, almost 40 Dublin transfers were prevented through collective actions 
held in front of accommodation centers for asylum-seeking persons (Hinger et al. 
2018). As in case D5, in case A5 acts of civil disobedience were performed in a 
small Austrian village in which five asylum seekers were threatened with Dublin 
transfers. The protest was initiated and largely supported by the village’s mayor as 
well as the local priest who, at one point, also gave shelter to the five beneficiaries. 
As in D5, the protesters in case A5 devised a phone tree that supporters signed up 
for. All the members on this list were informed in case of a deportation announce-
ment in order to gather and take sides with the beneficiaries, preventing the police 
and immigration officers from taking the person with them. When the actual depor-
tation attempt took place in the Austrian case, however, this was not prevented by 
such a gathering, but by the simple coincidence that the beneficiary was not in the 
accommodation at that point in time. In case CH3, disruption was based on a church 
occupation (without the explicit agreement of the church’s priest) when six asylum 
seekers, whose applications had been formally rejected due to the Dublin regula-
tion, and several Swiss activists moved into a church in order to hinder the potential 
execution of deportations of these persons and to express their public protest against 
Dublin transfers in general. The deportation of the six initial occupiers of the church, 
but also of further asylum seekers successively sheltered in the church, has been 
prevented since the beginning of these protests in March.
Disruption also turned out to be successful when physical access had already 
taken place, as in the case of the Pakistani who fled to Germany via Hungary (D4). 
The first anti-deportation protest event took place when the beneficiary had already 
been accompanied to the airplane by police officers. Both the beneficiary and 
another passenger in the deportation flight refused to sit down in the airplane. 
Consequently, the pilot, who has the authority to decide whom to transport, declined 
to take the two resisting passengers with him, stating he would not be able to guar-
antee the safety of the flight given their resistance.9
Despite slightly different moments in the deportation process, all these cases 
show that disruption works as a means of a last resort in order to interrupt the depor-
tation at the final stage of the physical removal of the beneficiaries. The mechanism 
is chosen when an immediate short-term reaction is necessary. This observation is 
supported by Jasper (2007, 4457), who pointed out that “[m]ilitancy, like most risky 
strategies, generally succeeds when a goal can be attained quickly and irreversibly.” 
In all of these Dublin cases, the protesters were able to prevent the imminent depor-
tation through disruption. This short-term success has to be read, as Kolb (2007, 
274) suggests, as a product of the protest group’s strength, its strategy, as well as the 
context. With regards to a possible state response to disruption, Kolb  (ibid., 74) 
highlighted that disruption practices cannot easily be repressed if a certain degree of 
9 This first deportation blockade was followed by two more blockades, the last one due to the court 
decision described above.
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sympathy from the public towards the actions of the protesters exists (also see (a) in 
this chapter for the public preference mechanism). In case D5, this sympathy was 
even indirectly expressed by the State Minister of the Interior and a former mayor 
of the city in which the protests took place. Following the media coverage and 
 public support caused by the mobilization, he saw no reason for a more repressive 
strategy in dealing with the protest actions, nor did he condemn the protesters 
(Fisser 2014). Without the support of the police, immigration officers were unable 
to enforce these deportation orders. In case D4, it was the specific constellation of 
authority which provided the basis for successful prevention thanks to disruption. 
While disruption turned out to be successful in these specific contexts in the short 
term, and was obviously necessary for potential success in the long term, it does not 
constitute a sufficient strategy to bring about long-term success. In our cases, the 
blockades indeed enabled the beneficiaries to gain access to an asylum procedure in 
the country of their choice–a success in the mid-term so to speak. In cases A5, D5, 
and CH3, this was achieved on the basis of the aforementioned timeframe for Dublin 
transfers, which opened up room for maneuver. In case D4, access to the asylum 
procedure did not directly follow exceeding the time-frame, but was based on the 
above-mentioned court decision. While the successful blockade of a deportation 
attempt by disruption does not necessarily mean that the concerned persons will be 
able to stay in the country in the long term, in the four above-mentioned cases 
almost all of the beneficiaries were ultimately either recognized as refugees, granted 
asylum or subsidiary protection, or received some other residency status that 
allowed them to stay.
6.5  What Is Worth the Effort?
Using Kolb’s approach, this chapter has described mechanisms that protesters may 
successfully activate, depending on the given political opportunity structures and 
the deportee’s particular situation. In our 15 case studies, we identified four key 
mechanisms, evaluating how and under which specific circumstances they were 
decisive for success or failure in the observed cases. It turned out that due to the 
particular character of anti-deportation protests, the choice of protest strategies was 
to a significant extent issue-specific and–despite some national differences, for 
example church asylum or occupation–demonstrated similarities between the three 
countries. This also holds for the explanation of success. Despite some difference in 
national regulations, several general observations with regard to the mechanisms 
can be made across the countries.
The judicial means mechanism relies on the legal contestation of deportation 
orders or the utilization of legal gaps or ambiguities allowing to juridically counter 
the decision. As the successful activation in many of the analyzed cases indicates, it 
appears to be especially effective in those cases where the initial decision is legally 
debatable. Its activation further requires the availability of competent legal advice 
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as well as often financial resources. If successful, it often entails a permanent right 
to stay for the beneficiary and provides the most sustainable solution.
Disruption, in contrast to judicial means, consists in physically obstructing the 
impending removal of the designated deportee. Even if it has proven to be an effec-
tive strategy in situations that demand immediate action in order to prevent an 
imminent deportation, it does not entail granting a permanent right to stay. In those 
cases where Dublin regulations applied, disruption appeared as a powerful tool to 
make the 6-month period of potential deportations to first-entry countries elapse. In 
these cases, the successfully activated public preference mechanism additionally 
provided a setting that made police and other executive officials hesitate to perform 
further attempts to deport.
Public preference and political access both aim to influence decision-makers’ 
opinions, either through public pressure and media coverage, or through direct 
negotiations via protest supporters who have access to decision-makers. Whereas 
most of the observed protests activate the public preference mechanism, it appears 
to be a risky strategy that may in certain contexts reinforce the authorities’ resolve 
and reduce the effectiveness of other mechanisms.
Indeed, most often several mechanisms are used in combination. While a strate-
gic and cumulative activation of mechanisms may favor success, some of our case 
studies showed how such strategies can backfire. The combination of public prefer-
ence and political access appeared to be counterproductive when the pressure 
exerted on authorities discouraged them from responding positively to attempts of 
direct negotiation, as they risked being perceived as weak or creating a precedent.
Final decisions on deportation cases are often the fruit of negotiations between 
political or administrative actors behind closed doors. Although we could observe 
how some protests managed to exert an influence on these actors by successfully 
activating the political access or the public preference mechanism, crucial negotia-
tions are hardly accessible with our methodological tools and therefore remain a 
black box–this is deserving of further investigation in subsequent studies.
6.6  Conclusion
The results presented in this chapter contribute to the body of protest and social 
movement literature in two ways: First, this chapter addresses the outcomes of anti- 
deportation protests by analyzing how and under which circumstances different 
mechanisms favor or hamper success. Even though explaining the outcome of some 
of the observed protests turned out to be difficult in some cases, we were able to 
identify patterns for success. Second, we engaged ourselves with another old debate 
within social movement studies and the political opportunity structures approach, 
specifically the relationship between exogenous and endogenous factors that lead to 
social change. In our cases, the interaction of contextual factors with protest- 
immanent mechanisms proved to be instructive, showing how existing opportunities 
are seized and transformed into effective protest strategies by actors.
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The third result goes beyond the analysis of mechanisms and, unexpectedly, 
questions the very notions of success and failure. For the purpose of this analysis, 
we defined success as preventing an impending deportation. However, the case stud-
ies showed that a form of success may be attained after a deportation is imple-
mented against the protesters’ resistance. Indeed, six of the seven deported  persons/
families–the negative cases in our sample–were able to return to the country from 
which they had been deported and ultimately obtained a residency permit. Since 
these returns were in all cases supported and co-organized by the participants of the 
previous protests, we conclude that the impact of protest activities reaches beyond 
the enforcement of a deportation order and may reveal its full effect at a later 
moment. These “late successes” also point to the overwhelming importance of 
social ties between the beneficiary and the protesters, as other researchers have also 
emphasized (see Rosenberger and Winkler 2014 and Part IV in this volume). 
Predating the protests and constructed or reinforced by them, these social ties indeed 
tie migrants to the country they chose to live in, allowing for effective resistance to 
the state’s attempts of forced removal. The determination of these persons to resist 
their deportation, and if necessary to return after having been deported, combined 
with the persistent solidarity and support of civil society actors from the host coun-
try, may thus be interpreted as one of the most influential aspects explaining success 
in the long run.
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 Appendix 1: Interviews
Interviews for the Austrian case studies (A1-A5) were led by Verena Stern (VS) and 
transcribed by Sandra Müller. Interviews for the German case studies (D1-D5) were 
led by Maren Kirchhoff (MK), Sophie Hinger (SH), David Lorenz (DL), Ricarda 
Wiese (RW), Stephan Liebscher (SL), and transcribed by Stephan Liebscher, 
Ricarda Wiese, Rejane Herwig and Sophie Hinger. Interviews for the Swiss case 
studies (CH1-CH5) were led by Dina Bader (DB) and Johanna Probst (JP), and 
transcribed by Hermione Lacour and David Lorenz (DL).
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Abbr. Interviewee(s) Date Place Interviewer
D1_1 Journalist 06/15/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_2 Designated deportee (oldest 
daughter)
06/09/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_3 Teacher 06/09/2015 Hamburg MK & SL
D1_4 Classmate/friend 06/09/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_5 Section leader, scout 
association
06/10/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_6 Lawyer 06/11/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_7 Member of Hardship 
Commission
06/16/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_8 Politician (Christian 
Democratic Union)
07/09/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_1 Designated deportee (middle 
daughter)
06/15/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_2 Leader of the institution in 
which the oldest daughter did 
an internship
06/08/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_3 Staffer of the internship 
institution
06/08/ & 
06/15/2015
Hamburg MK
D2_4 Teacher (of the two youngest 
children)
06/08/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_5 Acquaintance 06/16/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_6 Acquaintance 06/16/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_7 Supporter activated through 
media
06/17/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_8 Former member of Hardship 
Comm.
06/17/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_9 Social worker 06/18/2015 Hamburg MK
D3_1 Two activists (pro-migrant 
group)
06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_2 Social worker 06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_3 Member, Young Greens 06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_4 Politician (Green Party) 06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_5 Immigration officer 07/10/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_6 Activist, airport protest group 07/14/2015 Frankfurt MK
D4_1 Designated deportee 05/20/2015 Berlin DL
D4_2 Activist with secure residency 
status
05/20/2015 Berlin DL
D4_3 Activist with secure residency 
status
06/01/2015 Berlin DL
D4_4 Lawyer 06/01/2015 Berlin DL
D4_5 Activist with insecure 
residency status
06/26/2015 Berlin DL
(continued)
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Abbr. Interviewee(s) Date Place Interviewer
D5_1 Activist with secure residency 
status, No Lager & AG 
Flüchtlingshilfe
07/06/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_2 Activist with secure residency 
status, AG Flüchtlingshilfe
07/08/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_3 Activist with secure residency 
status, No Lager
07/16/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_4 Lawyer 07/20/2015 Osnabrück MK
D5_5 Neighbor, accommodation 
center
07/20/2015 Osnabrück SH + MK
D5_6 Activist with secure residency 
status, networker
07/21/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK & RW
D5_7 Protest participant with secure 
residency status
07/22/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_8 Church representative, AG 
Flüchtlingshilfe
07/22/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_9+ 10 Participants of spontaneous 
protest, insecure residency 
status
09/15/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_11 + 12 Designated deportee (and 
activist) & activist with secure 
residency status, No Lager
12/10/2014 
& 
12/14/2014
Osnabrück Michael Ruf (Bühne 
für Menschen-rechte)
A1_1 Politician (Green Party) 05/12/2015 Vienna VS
A1_2 Lawyer 05/29/2015 Vienna VS
A1_3 Psychiatrist for custody prior 
to deportation
06/22/2015 Vienna VS
A1_4 Politician (Green Party) 07/21/2015 Vienna VS
A1_5 Activist 05/20/2015 Vienna VS
A1_6 Social media expert, blogger 08/18/2015 Salzburg VS
A1_7 Activist 09/21/2015 Vienna VS
A1_8 Activist 09/29/2015 Vienna VS
A2_1 Doctor 10/02/2015 Upper 
Austria
VS
A2_2 Former politician (Social 
Democratic Party)
09/30/2015 Vienna VS
A2_3 Activist 10/02/2015 Vienna VS
A2_4 Priest & activist 10/02/2015 Upper 
Austria
VS
A2_5 Journalist 10/13/2015 Vienna VS
A2_6 Activist 10/21/2015 Vienna VS
A2_7 Activist 11/16/2015 Via e-mail VS
A2_8 Activist 11/03/2015 Via e-mail VS
A3_1 Journalist 05/13/2015 Vienna VS
A3_2 Journalist 05/28/2015 Vienna VS
A4_1 Lawyer 09/28/2015 Vienna VS
A5_1 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
(continued)
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Abbr. Interviewee(s) Date Place Interviewer
A5_2 Lawyer 08/21/2015 Vienna VS
A5_3 Activist, social worker 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_4 Priest 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_5 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_6 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_7 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_8 Mayor (Austrian People’s 
Party) & activist
10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_9 Activist 10/10/2015 Via e-mail VS
CH1_1 Employer & deputy at local 
council (Christian Democratic 
Party)
03/09/2015 Fribourg DB
CH1_2 Worker 03/09/2015 Fribourg DB
CH1_3 Designated deportee 03/09/2015 Fribourg DB
CH2_1 Designated deportee 21/07/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_2 Teacher, deputy at local 
council (extreme left)
10/07/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_3 Former officer in Swiss Army 13/07/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_4 National representative 
(Socialist Party), physician
19/08/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_5 Music producer 26/08/2015 Geneva DB
CH3_1 Activist 08/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_2 Activist, former journalist 30/06/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_3 Lawyer, extreme-left deputy, 
activist
07/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_4 National Councilor (Green 
Party)
08/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_5 Pastor 25/09/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_6 Two designated deportees 08/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH4_1 Legal advisor 18/08/2015 Vaud JP
CH4_2 Designated deportee 25/08/2015 Vaud JP
CH4_3 National Councilor (Socialist 
Party)
15/09/2015 Via 
telephone
JP
CH4_4 Journalist 22/09/2015 Vaud JP
CH4_5 Artist 07/08/2015 Vaud JP
CH4_6 National Councilor (Socialist 
Party)
16/09/2015 Via e-mail JP
CH5_1 + 2 Journalist 10/09/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_3 Member of local council 
(Social Democratic Party), 
activist
26/08/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_4 Manager of a company 23/09/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_5 Policeman, cantonal councilor 
(Swiss People’s Party)
01/10/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_6 School director 27/10/2015 Zurich JP
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